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Summary 
Agriculture has played a hugely important role in the recent history of Brazil’s economy. The country had a food 
production deficit until as late as the 1970s, but since the early twenty-first century has been one of the world’s 
principal exporters and a leader in production technologies adapted to tropical climates. Many researchers – and 
diplomats – have concluded that this is where Brazil can make its principal contribution to the African continent: 
supporting agrarian transition and helping to find ways of using local natural resources to build an agriculture with 
high productivity and improved commercial value. Brazil’s image of success always appears associated with the 
experience of programmes such as Prodecer and Proálcool, which led to its excellence in the production of soybeans 
and sugarcane bioethanol respectively. What underlies this image? The official discourse seeks to present the 
country as a simple case of complementary coexistence between a modern large-scale corporate agriculture segment 
and another segment based on small family producers. At another extreme of the debate is an alternative view: 
the discourse of the social movements, with a different reading but based on a similar dualism. The so-called Brazilian 
model, this discourse argues, is underpinned by an incurable conflict between these two segments, agribusiness 
being the antithesis of family farming. This paper seeks to show that a much more complex reality exists behind 
this binary interpretation. On the one hand, where the usual polarised view sets up the figure of agribusiness there 
are in reality at least three segments of the economy (one, indeed, made up of family producers, and another of 
companies that can hardly be described as agribusinesses). And where that view, on the other hand, posits ‘family 
agriculture’ as a single category, there are also three distinct narratives within that notion – each one articulated 
by a group of interests and organisations with different concepts about the role of agriculture in today’s world, the 
uses of technology and nature, and relations with the state and the market.
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China and Brazil in African Agriculture
Working Paper Series
http://www.future-agricultures.org/research/cbaa/8031-china-brazil-paper-series
This Working Paper series emerges from the China and Brazil in African Agriculture (CBAA) programme of the 
Future Agricultures Consortium. This is supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s ‘Rising Powers 
and Interdependent Futures’ programme (www.risingpowers.net). We expect 24 papers to be published during 
2015, each linked to short videos presented by the lead authors. 
The CBAA team is based in Brazil (University of Brasilia, Gertulio Vargas Foundation, and Universidade Federal 
do ABC), China (China Agricultural University, Beijing), Ethiopia (Ethiopian Agricultural Research Institute, Addis 
Ababa), Ghana (University of Ghana at Legon), Mozambique (Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos, Maputo), 
Zimbabwe (Research and Development Trust, Harare), the UK (the Institute of Development Studies, the International 
Institute for Environment and Development and the Overseas Development Institute). 
The team includes 25 researchers coming from a range of disciplines including development studies, economics, 
international relations, political science, social anthropology and sociology, but all with a commitment to cross-
disciplinary working. Most papers are thus the result of collaborative research, involving people from different 
countries and from different backgrounds. The papers are the preliminary results of this dialogue, debate, sharing 
and learning. 
As Working Papers they are not final products, but each has been discussed in project workshops and reviewed 
by other team members. At this stage, we are keen to share the results so far in order to gain feedback, and also 
because there is massive interest in the role of Brazil and China in Africa. Much of the commentary on such 
engagements are inaccurate and misleading, or presented in broad-brush generalities. Our project aimed to get 
behind these simplistic representations and find out what was really happening on the ground, and how this is 
being shaped by wider political and policy processes.
The papers fall broadly into two groups, with many overlaps. The first is a set of papers looking at the political 
economy context in Brazil and China. We argue that historical experiences in agriculture and poverty programmes, 
combine with domestic political economy dynamics, involving different political, commercial and diplomatic interests, 
to shape development cooperation engagements in Africa. How such narratives of agriculture and development 
– about for example food security, appropriate technology, policy models and so on - travel to and from Africa is 
important in our analysis. 
The second, larger set of papers focuses on case studies of development cooperation. They take a broadly-defined 
‘ethnographic’ stance, looking at how such engagements unfold in detail, while setting this in an understanding 
of the wider political economy in the particular African settings. There are, for example, major contrasts between 
how Brazilian and Chinese engagements unfold in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, dependant on 
historical experiences with economic reform, agricultural sector restructuring, aid commitments, as well as national 
political priorities and stances. These contrasts come out strikingly when reading across the papers. 
The cases also highlight the diversity of engagements grouped under ‘development cooperation’ in agriculture. 
Some focus on state-facilitated commercial investments; others are more akin to ‘aid projects’, but often with a 
business element; some focus on building platforms for developing capacity through a range of training centres 
and programmes; while others are ‘below-the-radar’ investments in agriculture by diaspora networks in Africa. The 
blurring of boundaries is a common theme, as is the complex relationships between state and business interests 
in new configurations.
This Working Paper series is one step in our research effort and collective analysis. Work is continuing, deepening 
and extending the cases, but also drawing out comparative and synthetic insights from the rich material presented 
in this series. 
Ian Scoones, Project Coordinator, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex
Working Paper 138 www.future-agricultures.org4
List of acronyms
CAIs   Complexos Agroindustriais, Agro-industrial Complexes
CONTAG  Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura, National Confederation of   
  Agricultural Workers 
CUT   Central Única dos Trabalhadores, Central Workers’ Confederation 
Embrapa  Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária, Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation
Embrater  Empresa Brasileira de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural, Brazilian Technical Assistance and  
  Rural Extension Corporation
FAO   Food and Agriculture Organization 
Fetraf   Federação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura Familiar, National Federation of Workers  
  in Family Farming
IBASE   Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas, Brazilian Institute for Social and   
  Economic Analysis
MAPA   Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento, Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock and  
  Food Supply
MDA   Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário, Ministry of Agrarian Development
MST  Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra, Landless Rural Workers’ Movement
Proálcool Programa Nacional do Álcool, National Alcohol Programme
Prodecer  Programa de Cooperação Nipo-Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento dos Cerrado, Japan-Brazil  
  Cooperation Programme for the Development of the Cerrado
Pronaf  Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar, National Programme to   
  Strengthen Family Agriculture
PT   Partido dos Trabalhadores, Workers’ Party
Working Paper 138 www.future-agricultures.org5
Introduction
In an interval of less than half a century – from the 
1960s to the 2000s – Brazil changed from a technologically 
backwards environment, where food supply was always 
a problem, to a completely different position as one of 
the world’s largest exports of meat and grain. This was 
achieved through the creation of capacities that made 
it possible to introduce significant innovations. Two 
examples are the adaptation for tropical agriculture of 
species such as soybean, generating an expansion of the 
farming frontier across the Cerrado savannah zone and 
into the borders of the Amazon region, and the 
development of technology for production of fuels from 
biomass, deriving bioethanol from sugarcane. One result 
has been that these sectors’ contributions to Brazilian 
exports increased considerably; another has been that 
Brazil became recognised internationally as having a 
strong capacity for research and innovation in tropical 
agriculture (Navarro et al. 2014). 
In this process of modernisation and intense 
technological development, clear priority was given to 
the economic segment made up of large rural properties, 
in a strong process of transformation of agro-industry 
characterised by economic concentration (Mattei 2014). 
But in the last 20 years a group of policies directed 
towards family-based farming have also been put into 
effect (Grisa and Schneider 2015). This segment now 
leads the production of – for example – poultry, pork 
and fruit (IBGE 2008). Coupled with the expansion of 
social policies in the countryside, this has expanded the 
Brazilian rural middle class by 73 percent in the years 
2000–2010 alone. This economic group now comprises 
the greater part of the population that lives in the 
countryside (Neri  2010). Also in this decade, for the first 
time, rural poverty rates have fallen below those of urban 
poverty in Brazil (IBGE 2014). 
For all of these reasons – because of its strength in 
generation of wealth; because of the innovation and the 
introduction of practices adapted to the reality of the 
tropics; and because of the coexistence of both corporate 
and family means of production – Brazilian agriculture 
has been portrayed, in public relations terms, as a model 
of success. This situation began to be promoted in Brazil’s 
sphere of international relations under the government 
of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, when the priorities in Brazil’s 
diplomacy were reoriented towards cooperation with 
the countries of the global South. It is in these terms that 
many see the main contribution that Brazil could offer 
to the African continent. Due to ecological similarities 
and a shared past including colonialism and slavery – 
according to this thinking – Brazil could mobilise its 
farming expertise and help African nations to develop 
their agricultural potential, increasing their levels of 
productivity and thus dealing simultaneously with 
poverty and with the challenge of achieving more 
dynamic economies. 
The main objective of this paper is to show that 
beneath the discourse of success of Brazilian agriculture 
in general, and of the complementarity between a 
corporate and a family sector in particular, a more 
complex reality is hidden – one which also calls into 
question the reduction of conflicts inherent in the 
Brazilian rural world to an incurable antithesis between 
agribusiness and family farming. 
What this paper intends to demonstrate, then, can be 
summed up in two principal points: 
First, what is now known as the Brazilian agricultural 
model is the result, shaped by and containing several 
contradictions, of a non-linear and not totally planned 
trajectory that can only be understood by reconstructing 
the configurations that took shape over the last four 
decades. This trajectory has resulted from the interaction 
of Brazil’s comparative advantages; changes in the 
international context; characteristics of the social forces 
and coalitions formed at key moments of recent Brazilian 
history; and changes reflecting contradictions in the 
model itself. In other words, it is not a model in the strict 
sense of the term, but a whole made up of contradictory 
components involving policies, social forces, and positive 
and negative effects. The consequence of this first 
argument is that there is no model to be exported, and 
that the positive effects achieved depended not on the 
Brazilian state alone, but also decisively on the pressure 
exercised by social organisations to create means and 
instruments to soften the high degree of economic 
concentration and environmental devastation that were 
built into the pattern of modernisation undertaken since 
the 1970s. 
Second, at each one of the stages experienced over 
the last 40 years these elements have combined and 
given rise to a complex structure of social forms of 
production – the most well-known of which do, indeed, 
involve the corporate segment (agribusiness) and the 
family farming segment. However, as well as this 
dichotomy, there are important subdivisions within both, 
and an understanding of this internal stratification is 
essential for understanding the limits to the inclusion of 
the poorer segments in the opportunities for participation 
in markets and value chains. At one pole of this duality 
– corporate agriculture – there are three different 
segments, and one of these is, in fact, made up of family 
producers. At the other pole – family farming – there are 
also three segments that are relatively distinct in their 
interests and forms of organisation. Based on these 
distinctions there are varied conceptions of the use of 
natural resources, relationship with the market, and use 
of technology. The principal consequence of this 
argument is to show that the conception that puts family 
farming and agribusiness on opposing sides of a single 
dichotomy has limitations. Not all large-scale agriculture 
is efficient from the productive point of view. Not all 
family agriculture is poor, nor produces food only for the 
domestic market, nor on a more sustainable basis, as 
many organisations affirm. As a consequence, the very 
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appropriateness of talking about a Brazilian model is 
significantly challenged. 
To demonstrate these ideas this text is organised into 
three main parts. The first gives a brief historical overview 
of the process of modernisation of Brazilian agriculture 
over the last 40 years, the institutional frameworks and 
the first investments in the Brazilian Green Revolution, 
up to the emergence of family farming as a player and 
a priority in public policies. In the second section, there 
is an explanation about the internal diversity of each of 
the two segments – ‘corporate agriculture’ and ‘family 
farming’. In the third section, the high-profile cases of 
the Programa de Cooperação Nipo-Brasileira para o 
Desenvolvimento do Cerrado (Prodecer, Japanese-
Brazilian Cooperation Programme for Development of 
the Cerrado) and Programa Nacional do Álcool (Proálcool, 
National Alcohol Program) are used to demonstrate the 
limitations of the lines of discourse based on the 
two-group concept for understanding the contradictions 
and conflicts that exist in the Brazilian farming sector. As 
part of the China and Brazil in African Agriculture Research 
Project, this paper aims to contribute reflections on the 
presence of Brazilian cooperation in Africa – 
demonstrating in this case in particular the domestic 
tensions that exist within Brazilian agriculture, beyond 
the current discourse based on the complementarity and 
coexistence of two sectors which some of its proponents 
seek to ‘export’. 
1. The ‘conservative   
 modernisation’ of Brazilian  
 agriculture, its conflicts,  
 and the resistance of a   
 segment of family   
 producers 
The origins of the present model go back to the 
military coup of 1964, at a time when Brazil recorded an 
ongoing deficit in food production. One of the most acute 
conflicts put on the country’s agenda was the question 
of land and farm ownership. The most significant 
organising forces in the country at the time included 
rural social movements. An agrarian reform was among 
the actions being proposed by then president João 
Goulart, who was in fact deposed by the military in that 
year. As a response to these pressures, the dictatorial 
government that was instituted after the military coup 
put in place a relatively rapid process that would become 
known as the ‘conservative modernisation’ of Brazilian 
agriculture (Pires and Ramos 2009), in an adaptation of 
the classic term used by Barrington Moore. For the 
military, it was necessary to provide a response to the 
growing agrarian conflicts, and at the same time boost 
production and productivity in this sector, so as to reduce 
external dependence and increase the supply of food 
– something which was important in the context of both 
the rapid urbanisation then in progress and also the rise 
in the costs of working-class social reproduction that the 
country was experiencing. All of this, however, had to 
be done without taking forward the structural 
transformations that were being called for by the 
progressive forces at the time, such as redistribution of 
the ownership of large rural properties.
 
Two major groups of initiatives gave shape to this 
project. A first group of measures, even before the end 
of the 1960s, involved the formation of a complete legal 
apparatus for the agrarian issue as a whole, to be 
regulated by the state in a context of authoritarianism 
(Medeiros 1988; Novaes 1997). The following were two 
examples: 
a) The creation of the Estatuto do Trabalhador 
Rural (Rural Worker’s Law), under which some of 
the fundamental rights of these workers were 
recognised, but differences between the rural and 
urban labour markets were also established. 
b) The creation of the Estatuto da Terra (Land Use 
Law), which disciplined the use and occupation 
of land throughout the country. This legal 
framework was relatively advanced for its time. It 
provided a classification of farming establishments, 
and it recognised the importance of the state 
guaranteeing access to land in units of sufficient 
size for farmers to sustain themselves. This legal 
structure was the basis for the creation of the 
Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária 
(Incra, National Agrarian Colonisation and Reform 
Institute) several years later. But a true agrarian 
reform was never implemented. The means 
of controlling land conflicts in Brazil consisted 
principally of transporting agricultural workers 
who were demanding land in the south of Brazil 
to the interior of the Amazon region, in areas that 
were remote and without infrastructure. 
If adoption of such measures by a dictatorial and 
conservative government may appear paradoxical, it is 
necessary to recognise that this was an effort at 
modernisation, and absorption of social conflicts into 
the state domain – the main effect and intention of which 
was to limit workers’ capacity for mobilisation, and 
thereby to impede contestation of the agrarian structure.
A second group of actions within the agricultural and 
land policy of the military period was the establishment 
of Complexos Agroindustriais (CAIs, Agro-industrial 
Complexes) as a strategy for modernisation of farming 
(Sorj 1984), which had the following principal instruments: 
a) Building capacity in technological research, and 
dissemination of its results: Aiming to increase 
Brazil’s agricultural productivity, the state invested 
heavily in technological research, with the creation 
of the Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária 
(Embrapa, Brazilian Agriculture and Livestock 
Research Corporation), and a highly capillary system 
of technical support extending into the countryside, 
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led by the Empresa Brasileira de Assistência Técnica 
e Extensão Rural (Embrater, Brazilian Technical 
Assistance and Rural Extension Corporation) and 
also involving similar agencies in the individual 
states, ensuring that the solutions found by state-
of-the-art research reached farmers rapidly. A 
large number of technical staff were sent to other 
countries, and international cooperation protocols 
were established with countries such as the USA 
and Japan. 
b) Bringing capital held as land into a business 
environment, and simultaneous creation of 
investment opportunities for industrial and 
financial capital: A National Rural Credit System 
was organised, which financed a transition for 
traditional large land holdings to highly technically-
qualified farming companies, absorbing the new 
technologies generated and disseminated by the 
research and technical assistance systems. In some 
of the more dynamic sectors of farm production, 
conditions were gradually being created for land, 
industrial and financial capital to be brought 
together into agribusiness undertakings. Through 
this process there was strong capitalisation of the 
sector, formation of a modern entrepreneurial 
sector and integration between dynamic systems 
of production and distribution. Further, sectors 
providing capital goods for agriculture (machinery 
and equipment), inputs (fertilisers and pesticides) 
and services (financial and technical) were also 
gradually created, forming what some of the 
literature calls an inter-sectorial agroindustrial 
complex and further increasing the weight of 
agriculture and its related activities in the Brazilian 
economy. 
 
c) Effects of conditions outside the sector: A final 
aspect that cannot be neglected is the fact that 
certain conditions external to the farming sector 
favoured its expansion. These include fiscal and 
foreign exchange measures that gave the farming 
sector a more privileged position and favoured its 
competitiveness; and also indirect aspects such as 
the strong process of urbanisation that took place 
in the period. In the space of one generation, the 
proportion of Brazil’s population living in rural 
and urban areas simply inverted: from 80 percent 
rural and 20 percent urban up to the 1960s, to 20 
percent rural and 80 percent urban by the end of 
the century. This on the one hand enabled the 
cities to absorb a large contingent of agricultural 
workers made redundant by the introduction 
of new technologies, minimising the conflicts 
generated by the modernisation of agriculture; 
and on the other hand facilitated the development 
of a lower-wage urban labour market, due to the 
enormous availability of manpower that had been 
made possible by new techniques and technology 
in the agricultural sector. 
Thus, as can be seen, the expansion and construction 
that has led to modern Brazilian agriculture involved a 
very specific context that would be difficult to reproduce 
in a different set of historical conditions. It was not only 
a question of investment in a sector, but of a large-scale 
mobilisation of political and financial resources within 
a wider project, which brought together a variety of 
different policy instruments, and sought to shape various 
demographic, social and economic variables. It should 
not be ignored that the speed with which this process 
took place is associated with the context of 
authoritarianism, which made it possible to adopt 
measures while avoiding contestations and negotiations 
with social organisations. 
The successful side of this initiative is recognised 
worldwide: Brazil, over the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, became a major agricultural producer and 
exporter. But this process as a whole had heavy social, 
environmental and financial costs. 
It was a period of strong concentration of land 
ownership. The expansion of capitalist investments in 
agriculture displaced traditional populations. 
Technological modernisation made a significant part of 
the workforce redundant (sugarcane cultivation employs 
on average one worker for every 100ha; in soybean this 
figure rises to 200ha, and in extensive cattle-ranching 
to around 400ha). The counterpart of this was the well-
known process of exodus from the countryside, 
generating excessive growth in the great metropolitan 
centres (and with this, chaotic urbanisation and a steep 
rise in the price of urban land), as well as constitution of 
an industrial labour market with downward pressure on 
salaries due to the large-scale supply of labour. 
From the socio-economic and political angle, this also 
involved the maintenance of a backwards sector of large 
landowners which survived due to their part in the 
alliance that sustained the military regime. Although they 
had not been integrated into the dynamic circuits of 
accumulation and capital, this segment of rural 
landowners maintained its position because its low 
productivity was compensated for by income transfers 
operated through subsidised credit and renegotiation 
of debts, a practice that remained commonplace for 
decade after decade. In return, these landowners 
provided political support to the regime. This is one of 
the strongest centres of conservatism in Brazilian politics. 
Its bases were described in a classic analysis of the 
formation of the country, ‘The Culture of the “Colonel”, 
the Hoe and the Vote’ (‘Coronelismo, Enxada e Voto’), by 
Victor Nunes Leal (Leal 2012). This grouping remains alive, 
for example, in the ‘Rural Caucus’ in Congress (a group 
of congressmen with this profile, who organise 
themselves around the interests of large rural landowners 
in the Congress, and consistently support conservative 
measures and legislative agendas). 
From the environmental angle, the consolidation of 
this pattern in Brazilian agriculture led to a strong move 
to expand production in the Cerrado ecosystem 
northward, practically eliminating the forests of this 
biome and generating pressure on the fringes of the 
Amazon region. As well as the geographical expansion 
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of agricultural production, the production model, based 
on monocultures and the use of chemical inputs, had 
severe side-effects resulting from the intensity with 
which it used soils and water, as well as high levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions.
Due to these negative effects, over time, and with the 
weakening of the military regime, the bases of 
organisation of Brazilian farming changed, and 
contestation increased. Starting in the 1980s there were 
two important changes: the Brazilian state’s crisis of 
financing forced a reshaping of agricultural policy; and 
the authoritarian government’s loss of legitimacy 
brought with it a resurgence of social movements in the 
countryside. 
In agricultural policy, the priority continued to be the 
increase of productivity to meet domestic demand and 
boost exports. But the instruments changed: instead of 
subsidised credit and heavy investments in technological 
innovation, the policy became one of support via a 
strategy of minimum prices and government guarantees 
(Guanzirolli 2014). This was an attempt to get around 
financing constraints and create incentives for the 
transfer to entrepreneurs of a greater role as protagonists 
in the dynamics of the sector. 
In relation to the social movements, the context was 
one of growing conflict. An increasing number of people 
died in confrontations relating to possession of land, 
involving peasants and large landowners, principally in 
the areas of expansion of the farming frontier such as 
the Cerrado and the Amazon. There was a strong 
resumption of the activities of rural social movements. 
The Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na 
Agricultura (Contag, National Farm Workers’ Association), 
created in the 1960s, began to re-mobilise in the context 
of the country’s gradual re-democratisation. The 
Comissão Pastoral da Terra (CPT, Church Land Commission), 
an expression of the Catholic Left influenced by Liberation 
Theology which had been created in 1975, exercised 
influence on a wide-ranging group of rural workers’ 
unions, which took part in the creation of the Central 
Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT, Central Union Congress) 
in 1983. And in 1985 the Movimento dos Trabalhadores 
Rurais Sem-Terra (MST, Landless Rural Workers’ Movement) 
was formed; its core activity was to be the occupation 
of lands as a form of denunciation, and the creation of 
agrarian reform settlement areas as a production 
alternative. As a response, the landowners and rural 
employers also grew more radical, creating the União 
Democrática Ruralista (UDR, Rural Landowners’ 
Democratic Union), which argued for the right to use 
violence in defence of property. 
The peak of these confrontations took place around 
the National Constituent Assembly of 1988, when the 
new Brazilian Constitution was formulated. It recognised 
land as having a social function, and acknowledged the 
demands of social movements for agrarian reform. At 
the same time, however, various legal hurdles to putting 
this principle into practice were created, such as 
maintenance of outdated values for productivity indices 
(used to identify areas that were unproductive and thus 
eligible for compulsory purchase), making the actual 
redistribution of land an almost unfeasible prospect. 
The ambiguity of the state’s actions – trying to balance 
its commitments to the traditional large landowners and 
the emerging entrepreneurial sector of Brazilian 
agriculture on the one hand, while responding to social 
criticism on the other – was maintained throughout the 
1990s, but an important realignment gradually emerged 
in the discourse of the rural social organisations. The UDR, 
strongly identified with the most conservative segment 
of the traditional large landowners, left the scene, and 
representation of the entrepreneurial sector was taken 
up by other organisations such as the Associação Brasileira 
do Agronegócio (ABAG, Brazilian Agribusiness Association) 
and later the Sociedade Rural Brasileira (SRB, Brazilian 
Rural Society) and Confederação Nacional da Agricultura 
(CNA, National Agriculture Federation) (Bruno 1997). 
Brazil’s Ministers of Agriculture in the subsequent decade 
would come from these organisations. 
The most important change in the 1990s was the 
identity expressed by these organisations. All of them 
began to speak in the name of the ‘modern rural 
productive sector’, or of rural entrepreneurs, while 
nonetheless incorporating alongside this in their claims 
and agendas the interests of the old traditional large 
landowners. From that moment until today these 
organisations would oppose any attempt to change the 
agrarian or environmental legislation, on the grounds 
that this would penalise the modern class of rural 
producers. This is an alliance that maintains the bases of 
an out-of-date sector, which compensates for its 
economic inefficiency with transfers of public funds – and 
does so based on either the old-fashioned exercise of 
political power or the provision of political support to 
coalitions that are in control of the state. In return, the 
members of Congress aligned with the old landowning 
interests bring pressure to bear on the state to maintain 
the priority given to the primary sector of the economy. 
This period also saw important changes in the 
representation of small farmers and rural workers. The 
MST continued to adopt a more confrontational stance, 
remaining faithful to the fight for agrarian reform – but 
experienced difficulties in making a practical proposition 
out of the rural settlements that it created, which were 
usually islands amid social structures dominated by the 
large landholdings. The union-linked organisations 
progressively relegated their struggle for agrarian reform 
and rights of workers employed on large farms to a 
second-order priority, and began to call for what their 
documents call an ‘alternative plan for rural development 
based on family farming’ (Favareto 2006). 
The abandonment of the identity of ‘rural workers’ and 
adoption of that of ‘family farmers’ has a range of 
meanings. One of the main ones is an implicit acceptance 
that even in the absence of structural changes in 
landholding in Brazil, there is a sector of small farmers 
that can be efficient, and which thus become legitimate 
beneficiaries of agricultural policy. The demands of these 
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segments of small producers led, at the end of the 1990s, 
to the creation of a specific programme, the Programa 
Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar (Pronaf, 
National Programme to Strengthen Family Farming), and 
a few years later to the creation of the Ministério do 
Desenvolvimento Agrário (MDA, Agrarian Development 
Ministry). Between 1999 and 2016, when it was 
downgraded by the new government that came to power 
after the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff, the 
MDA would come to share – albeit with a much smaller 
structure and importance – the role of leading on 
agricultural policy with the Ministério da Agricultura, 
Pecuária e Abastecimento (MAPA, Ministry for Agriculture, 
Livestock and Food Supply). 
For several years Pronaf remained a small-scale 
programme. This changed somewhat in the 2000s, when 
a new phase of Brazilian agricultural policy began. With 
the arrival in power of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, 
Workers’ Party) of President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, the 
struggle against hunger and poverty became part of the 
priorities of the state. There was a major increase in the 
funds invested and a creation of various complementary 
programmes, such as the Food Purchase Programme, 
the National School Feeding Programme, the More Food 
Programme, and the Crop Insurance System, all of which 
centred on strengthening this segment of small farmers. 
The higher volume of funds did not, however, signify an 
overall inversion of priorities, because the amounts 
allocated to the large-farm segment also increased by 
the same proportion during this period. 
At the same time as funding for family farming grew, 
the MST and the struggle for land underwent an 
inflection: the full-employment context of the 2000s 
exhausted the social demand for agrarian reform, thus 
helping to reduce the tension in the countryside. Amid 
this situation the interests of agribusiness, instead of 
being minimised, were supported and strengthened. 
The best image of the wide-ranging coalition that 
formed in the Brazilian state in the 2000s is the ministerial 
structure, with the leadership of the MAPA being handed 
to the principal business leader of the corporate farming 
sector and a former chairman of the SRB, while the 
leadership of the MDA was given to a former director of 
the CUT. The presidency of Incra was allocated to an 
official of the MST, and the second-tier secretariats of 
the MDA were occupied by officials whose names had 
been put forward by the family farming unions. 
The positive indicators achieved by both segments in 
this period enabled the Brazilian government to claim 
that there was a complementarity between the two 
sectors. However, the rhetoric of the rural social 
movements and of many non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) describes what is really taking place 
as a situation of conflict. This is expressed in at least four 
fundamental aspects: 
a) The disassociation between regions of production 
and regions of employment: A look at the maps 
that show where Brazilian corporate farming 
is concentrated and where the poorest family 
farming is concentrated shows clearly that there 
is a concentration of farming GDP in the regions 
of more modern and technological agriculture, 
but with a low degree of creation of farming jobs 
or presence of small farmers. Looked at from the 
point of view of the social movements, a pattern 
of rural development with high levels of wealth 
creation is established, but ‘without people’. On 
the other hand, the maps show that in the regions 
where small producers predominate, there is a high 
level of generation of work and employment but 
little generation of wealth, making them strongly 
dependent on transfers of government funds. That 
is to say, the wealth generated by agribusiness 
generates negative social counter-effects that need 
to be permanently compensated for by the state. 
b) The long-term environmental costs that sustain short-
term competitiveness could destroy the bases of long-
term competitiveness: The expansion of Brazilian 
agricultural production has been underpinned 
by two main factors: gains in productivity and 
expansion of the agricultural frontier. A large share 
of the process of conservative modernisation took 
place with the occupation of the Cerrado, thanks 
to the adaptation of soybean to this ecosystem, 
with a negative effect on its resilience. At present, 
the frontier of expansion involves incorporation of 
lands situated in the Amazon biome. The main factor 
responsible for deforestation in this area has been 
a group of three activities: logging, cattle raising 
and soybean cultivation. In the opinion of many 
critics, this constitutes a decision to damage the 
natural resource base that is a fundamental factor 
for the medium and long-term strategic outlooks, 
in a context characterised by increasingly acute 
pressure on the environment and the growing 
importance of biodiversity and biotechnologies. In 
longer-established areas of agricultural production 
the environmental problems are no smaller. For 
example, the incentive for production of sugar 
and bioethanol has led to conversion of areas of 
pasture and food crops into areas for production 
of sugarcane, with very negative effects on the 
landscape, an intensification of natural resource 
use and an erosion of biodiversity. 
c) The political costs of dependence on agribusiness: 
The loss of competitiveness of Brazilian industry, 
associated with the context of a crisis in the 
international financial system, makes the country’s 
economy dependent on its exports of minerals 
and farm products, leading to a process of 
‘re-primarisation’ of the economy. As well as the 
problems inherent in the weakening of Brazil’s 
international trade position, making it a hostage 
to the market for low-added-value products, the 
country faces a situation of political dependence 
on this segment. This is something that is highly 
undesirable when one considers that during the 
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period when Brazil’s Presidency was held by Lula 
and his PT successor Dilma Rousseff (between 2003 
and 2016), the Rural Caucus in Congress was the 
principal factor responsible for the conservative 
agenda in Brazil’s legislature, blocking an agenda 
of deeper structural changes of a redistributive and 
democratising nature.
d) An asymmetric model: Finally, critics point to 
the strong asymmetry in the support received 
by the corporate and family farming sectors of 
Brazilian agriculture. Even when there were two 
ministries, it was in the Agriculture Ministry that 
the stronger instruments were found – such as 
Embrapa, responsible for agricultural research 
and innovation, and historically aligned with the 
interests of corporate farmers. The disparity is 
evident even in the volume of government credit 
allocated: in the 2014-15 Crop Financing Plan, 
150bn Real (approximately US$39bn) was allocated 
to corporate agriculture, and approximately 20bn 
Real (US$5bn) to family farming, although the 
latter accounts for 80 percent of the total number 
of farms. 
For all of these reasons, according to some authors 
there is an incurable conflict between these two 
segments. The farming model based on agribusiness, 
they say, sees generation of production and income as 
the principal function of rural areas and of natural 
resource use (Buainain et al. 2014); while those who argue 
for an agricultural model predominantly based on family 
farming argue that this option would make it possible 
for rural areas to be seen not only as sites of production, 
but also as territories for living, since support for these 
forms of social organisation is more likely to favour the 
absorption of labour, diversification of production and 
less intensive use of natural resources (Silva and Miranda 
2014). 
While this opposition between the entrepreneurial 
and family sectors is a real one, it is also necessary to 
consider that it brings with it a certain simplification of 
the reality. This simplification is certainly useful for the 
confrontation between two conceptions of rural 
development. But it oversimplifies the range of interests, 
narratives and forms of organisation that have been 
created over the last 40 years of development of 
agriculture in Brazil. The next section aims to demonstrate 
this complexity, going beyond the dichotomy that is 
often taken for granted in general discussions of the issue 
and even in a good number of serious academic analyses. 
2. Beyond the dichotomy 
2.1  Two agricultures, or several?
A decisive moment for understanding the conflict of 
narratives about the model of Brazilian agricultural 
development came in 1994, when the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) published a report in 
partnership with Brazil’s Incra. The document, entitled 
Diretrizes de Política Agrária e de Desenvolvimento 
Sustentável (‘Guidelines of Agrarian Policy and Sustainable 
Development’), circulated widely and is considered by 
many to be one of the most influential documents in the 
construction of public policies for the Brazilian 
countryside (Guanzirolli 2014; Abramovay and Veiga 
1999; FAO/Incra 1994). After summing up the trajectories 
of Brazilian farming and the whole process of ‘conservative 
modernisation’, the study concluded that, in spite of two 
decades of priority for large properties in terms of 
technology and financing, there was an important 
segment of small producers whose performance was 
similar to that experienced by the large production units. 
This added a new line of identity, and discourse, according 
to which it would be wrong to talk about small-scale 
producers, since in spite of the small size of the 
establishments, the volume of production they achieved 
left nothing to be desired in comparison to the large 
undertakings. The distinctive characteristic, thus, was not 
the size of output or of the landholding, but the family-
based nature of the work and of the management of 
these undertakings (Veiga 1993; Abramovay 1992). It is 
important to note that this FAO/Incra study also did not 
articulate a dichotomy between agribusiness and family 
farming. The distinction it made lay in whether there was 
corporate or family ownership. That is to say, in the former 
there is a separation of management and labour, whereas 
in the latter they are inseparable – and this view 
acknowledges that part of the family farming sector will 
establish itself on a business basis, in the same way as 
the large establishments. 
The table below shows the main distinctions between 
the two forms of production – aspects that would come 
to sustain a wide-ranging polarisation of public debate 
over the two subsequent decades.
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Corporate agriculture Family farming
Total separation between management and work Deep relationship between management and work 
Centralised organisation
Direction of the production process directly by the 
farmer and his family
Specialisation Diversification 
Salaried work predominant Salaried work occasional 
Average area 433ha Average area around 26ha 
Table 1: Characterisation of family farming based on its comparison with corporate agriculture
The report had a high impact at a moment when the 
Brazilian economy was undergoing a serious crisis, with 
high levels of foreign debt, growing production costs 
and increasing unemployment. Its statements lent 
legitimacy to the narrative of a broad-based coalition 
involving rural social movements, sectors of the academic 
community and a portion of the government bureaucracy 
who were interested in promoting an alternative to the 
conservative modernisation of Brazilian agriculture. 
According to the criteria used by the authors of the 
study, in the mid-1990s, 85 percent of the 4.8m farming 
establishments in Brazil could be described as family 
farms, and these accounted for 76 percent of the 
agricultural workforce. In spite of this, they occupied only 
30 percent of the agricultural land, and contributed 38 
percent of the total value of production. A specific 
sub-group of approximately 400,000 units, however, 
achieved levels of performance similar to that of large-
scale farming. This high-yield segment was baptised, in 
this report, as ‘consolidated family farming’. At the other 
extreme of the family establishments, the units with low 
performance were classified as a ‘peripheral fringe’ of 
Brazilian farming. This contained the greater part of the 
family establishments – some 2m units. And finally, there 
was an intermediate group, of 2.4m establishments, 
referred to as ‘family farming in transition’. These were 
designated as the target public of a group of policies 
designed to raise their levels of productivity through a 
process of modernisation. This logic was mobilised in 
the creation of Pronaf, in 1995, as the first credit 
programme specifically directed toward family farming. 
One year later the MDA was created, as a response to 
the land ownership conflicts that were worsening at the 
time and with the aim of promoting policies to support 
these various segments. 
Although the FAO/Incra study does not mention this, 
in the large-farm sector the establishments can also be 
divided into at least two segments: a sector of extremely 
low productivity, in which the possession of land serves 
an essentially patrimonialist function; and another with 
high productivity, organised along entrepreneurial lines 
(IBGE 2008). Both are supported by the policies 
coordinated by the MAPA. The two groups, however, have 
very different interests, reflecting particular economic 
and social characteristics in terms of relationships with 
the market and the state. 
In practice, thus, Brazilian agriculture includes multiple 
different groups, and not only the two categories 
expressed in the ‘two-sector’ narrative – whose 
institutional expression was marked for a long period by 
the existence of two ministries. The figure below shows 
a schematic representation of this stratification of the 
social forms of production in Brazilian agriculture, going 
beyond the articulation of a dichotomy between 
agribusiness and family farming which has become 
predominant.
Figure 1 – Schematic representation of the social structures of production in Brazilian farming
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How is this structure of segments represented by the 
organisations that exist in rural Brazil today? The following 
are brief notes on the profile of each organisation, and 
the segments that they represent.
MST: The Landless Rural Workers’ Movement was 
created at the beginning of the 1980s, initially from a 
social base of farmers in the south of the country. With 
the passing of years it achieved national scope. In the 
mid-1990s, while maintaining its presence in the five 
regions of the country (South, Southeast, Centre-West, 
Northeast and North), it began to give priority to a group 
of actions in São Paulo, the richest State in the Southeast, 
as a means of gaining greater press coverage. This was 
a very successful strategy. At the turn of the century the 
MST made two innovations in its political project: it began 
to give greater emphasis to international coordination 
and communication, becoming one of the principal 
actors of Via Campesina (a significant world network of 
movements and organisations opposing strategies of 
transnational companies in the food and agriculture 
sector), which gave it a network of support and capacity 
for influence beyond the frontiers of Brazil; and, at the 
same time, it gave a greater emphasis to agroecology in 
its discourse, as a model for organisation of agriculture 
in opposition to agribusiness. The MST’s main interest 
in agrarian reform, beyond meeting the immediate 
demands of its grassroots constituency, is to make the 
struggle for land one of the fronts in its struggle against 
capitalism. In this vision, the measures of success of its 
land policy are the weakening of political and economic 
power for the corporate sector of Brazilian agriculture, 
and the expansion in numbers and importance of what 
the movement calls the ‘peasant sector’ (or ‘peasant 
family farming production’) in the countryside as a whole. 
The main social base of the MST is the segment of family 
farmers that operate closest to the poverty line. In its 
discourse, it places the ‘consolidated family farmer’ sector 
in the same category as the corporate sector. 
Other landless workers’ movements: Over the last 
20 years, other movements of landless workers, mainly 
operating regionally, have emerged from breakaway 
factions of the MST or been encouraged and motivated 
by socialist-oriented political groups. Examples include 
the Movimento Camponês Corumbiara (Corumbiara 
Peasant Movement), operating principally in the Northern 
Region; and the Movimento de Libertação dos Sem-Terra 
(Landless Workers’ Liberation Movement), operating 
mainly in certain areas of the Northeast. Their differences 
from the MST relate to organisational aspects, and 
sometimes to strategies for confrontation with farmers, 
large landowners and the state itself. There is not a 
substantial difference in their visions of the process of 
land reform or the social processes that are under way 
in the countryside. The different movements’ social bases 
are also similar. 
CPT: The Church Land Commission is an organisation 
of the Catholic Church, which has a history of action on 
the issue of land rights. It was created in the 1970s, and 
was largely responsible for training the leaders who, years 
later, created the MST and reinvigorated the union 
movement in the countryside. Although it is an 
organisation linked to the Conferência Nacional dos Bispos 
do Brasil (CNBB, National Conference of Brazilian Bishops), 
the CPT is relatively autonomous and independent in 
relation to the hierarchy of the Church. Even at the local 
level, there are situations in which the operations of the 
CPT, due to the strong weight of the work of community 
leaders, are not in accordance with the orientations of 
the local bishop. And as to its relationship with the 
movements, although there is a strong proximity 
between the line of action of the CPT and of the MST, 
there are places where the activity of the CPT is 
independent and even more radical than that of the MST 
itself. The grassroots constituency under the influence 
of the CPT includes farmers who tend to belong to the 
movements that identify themselves as involved in a 
struggle for land, but also part of the ‘farmers in transition’ 
segment. 
Contag: The National Federation of Agricultural 
Workers was created in the 1960s. During the period of 
the military dictatorship it maintained a non-confrontational 
line of action to avoid interventions from the authoritarian 
state. Historically it has structured its activity around two 
core themes, land reform and workers’ employment 
rights – in particular because its main social base 
consisted of rural workers of the northeast, and especially 
the sugar-growing Zona da Mata (Forest Zone) coastal 
belt. Up to the 1980s, thanks to the fact that Brazilian 
union legislation allowed only one union of rural workers 
per municipality (all of which were automatically affiliated 
to the sector’s National Federation), Contag succeeded 
in establishing a wide network of local organisations. 
Formally, there are more than 4,000 municipal unions of 
rural workers (of which approximately 2,800 actually 
operate, rather than having a merely pro-forma existence), 
organised in Federações Estaduais de Trabalhadores na 
Agricultura (State Agricultural Workers’ Federations) 
present in all the states, which are in turn organised 
nationally by Contag. This is in fact the greatest degree 
of capillarity achieved by any of the Brazilian rural social 
movements. In the period of re-democratisation, Contag’s 
hegemony was questioned by the unions of rural workers 
connected to the CUT, created and operating under the 
influence of the CPT. This line of rural union organisation 
linked to the CUT had between 700 and 1,000 member 
unions. The dispute between the two lines came to an 
end in the mid-1990s, when Contag affiliated itself to 
the CUT. At that moment the key agendas of struggle 
for the union movements ceased to be land reform and 
workers’ employment rights. Land reform, from the 1980s, 
became an agenda championed by the MST, and workers’ 
employment rights lost importance due to the extremely 
strong reduction in the number of salaried rural workers 
in the country, as a result of the agricultural modernisation 
process. In place of these agendas, rural unions began 
to demand an ‘alternative plan for rural development 
based on family farming and land reform’. In spite of the 
reference to land reform, it was family farming (defined 
as comprising small farmers whose livelihoods depend 
on what their farms produce and who have a maximum 
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of four ‘tax modules’ of land) that began to be Contag’s 
public and its support base. In line with this, Pronaf 
became the most important policy for this organisation. 
In the mid-2000s Contag formally separated from the 
CUT, but a good part of its state unions and federations 
remained affiliated. The social groups most widely 
represented by these unions comprise the ‘family farmers 
in transition’ and the poorest farmers. Legally, the unions 
also represent the ‘consolidated family farmer’ segment, 
but their discourse does not reflect the interests of this 
segment – which consequently finds itself pushed toward 
representation by the corporate sector. 
Other family farming organisations: Some of the 
rural union organisations linked to the CUT have 
challenged Contag. In the 1990s this segment created a 
new organisation, the Federação Nacional dos 
Trabalhadores na Agricultura Familiar – Fetraf (National 
Federation of Workers in Family Farming). This consisted 
of leaders originally influenced by the CPT, but who no 
longer saw their principal demands as represented by 
the transformational slogans of struggle (such as land 
reform). Part of their demands are met today by the state, 
for example through Pronaf. They are significant unions 
in parts of the southern region, north and northeast. 
Their line of activity, however, does not differ substantially 
from Contag’s, and their social base is the same. 
Other support and advisory organisations: There 
is a wide network of support and advisory organisations 
that works directly or indirectly on land ownership issues, 
giving advice to rural social movements or developing 
public campaigns. It includes the Instituto Brasileiro de 
Análises Sociais e Econômicas (IBASE, Brazilian Institute 
for Social and Economic Analysis), one of the most 
important Brazilian NGOs; ActionAid, an international 
NGO which has a substantial operation in Brazil; the 
Conselho Indigenista Missionário (CIMI, Indigenous 
Missionary Council); the Rede de Tecnologias Alternativas 
para a Agricultura (AS-PTA, Network of Alternative 
Technologies for Farming); and many others that operate 
locally. This network’s discourse is addressed above all 
to the poorest farmers. 
In the field of corporate agriculture, recent years have 
brought some changes to the list of players operating 
in the public debate about the federal government’s land 
policy. Traditional players such as the UDR and SRB have 
left the scene, and the expression and representation of 
corporate farming interests today is concentrated in the 
CNA and its leading exponent, Senator Kátia Abreu. But 
even in the corporate sector of Brazilian agriculture there 
are leaders who are more open to a dialogue with social 
and environmental demands. Two examples are Marcos 
Jank, the former chair of the União da Indústria da Cana 
de Açúcar (Única, Sugarcane Industry Federation) who 
is currently working for the food giant BRF; and the former 
agriculture minister Roberto Rodrigues. 
CNA: The National Farming Federation has succeeded 
in unifying the interests of the whole of the Brazilian 
corporate farming sector, from the most traditional to 
the most up-to-date. More than this, part of the family 
farming segment has joined the system of unions and 
federations led by the CNA, attracted by its discourse in 
favour of rural producers. The CNA has a solid national 
organisation with strong capillarity. Its keynote is the 
defence of agribusiness, presented as an up-to-date 
sector that is responsible for a good part of Brazil’s success 
in the international field of agricultural production. Any 
proposal to change the legal framework that regulates 
Brazilian farming, in the direction of penalising the more 
archaic sectors, is derided by the CNA as damaging and 
as creating an ‘environment of insecurity and instability’ 
that will finish up removing incentives from Brazilian 
agriculture. As well as opposing modernising reforms, 
in 2012 this organisation led the reform of the Brazilian 
Forest Code, and it is currently investing energy in a 
reformulation of Brazilian legislation on demarcation of 
indigenous lands. These organisations have disputed, 
with the unions, the representation of the ‘consolidated’ 
family farmers and those in an intermediate situation. 
The Rural Caucus in Congress: This has been one of 
the most highly-coordinated and active groups organised 
in Congress since the 1988 Constituent Assembly. 
Characterised by predominantly conservative positions, 
it functions as a species of legislative arm of the CNA. It 
predominantly comprises representatives of the most 
archaic and patrimonialist sectors of Brazilian farming. 
But its power is also used by the corporate sectors to 
increase their capacity for pressure and claims on the 
state, underlining the discourse that there is ‘only one 
agriculture’. 
2.2  The dispute between the   
 narratives on the development of  
 Brazilian farming 
The formulations that are built on dualism, and the 
policies associated with them, do not necessarily shape 
the behaviour of the political players, whether inside the 
state or outside. What does exist, reflecting these different 
positions and interests, is a series of competing narratives 
about family farming, corporate farming and the use of 
public funds. Beyond dualism there is a political 
fragmentation that finds its expression in the debates 
on family farming – and more widely on agriculture, land 
use and rural development. The organisations mentioned 
above tend to converge around one of three dominant 
narratives (Cabral et al. 2016): 
Narrative 1: ‘There is only one agriculture’ 
The essence of this narrative is the affirmation that 
agriculture, whether practiced by family undertakings 
or major corporations, is all one and the same. In this 
narrative the subdivisions, above all within the sector of 
large establishments, are vehemently refuted, and the 
statement that there are specificities in the family 
segment is seen as a mere politically-motivated rhetorical 
construction (Navarro 2010). According to this line of 
discourse, the producers that are classified as up-to-date 
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(those which were called ‘consolidated’ or ‘in transition’ 
in the FAO study) are not differentiated from the large 
producers. All of them need credit, technology and access 
to the market. As a consequence, the existence of 
differentiated policies for family agriculture (such as 
Pronaf) or differentiated institutional spaces (such as the 
MDA) are seen as unnecessary. The others (the segment 
classified as ‘fringe’ in the FAO study) are not seen as a 
public of real farmers. According to this view, for these 
farmers social protection policies would be more 
appropriate, due to their difficulty in attaining the levels 
of skill and production resources that would enable them 
to compete with the other segments. Their disappearance 
as farmers is seen as a natural process in the context of 
a competitive farming economy (Buainain et al. 2014; 
Alves and Rocha 2010; Navarro 2010). 
This discourse is adopted by corporate leaders who 
present themselves as modern rural producers, brought 
together in organisations such as the SRB and CNA. This 
vision is also adopted by the MAPA and the Rural Caucus 
in Congress. After the impeachment of President Dilma 
Rousseff in 2016, it was deployed by members of the 
new government who argued successfully for the 
downgrading of the MDA (which was reduced to the 
status of a Secretariat, initially in the Social Development 
Ministry and later in the Presidency), though the strength 
of the reactions that this provoked later led the 
government to promise to reinstate the MDA’s ministerial 
status.
The constituency that identifies itself with this 
discourse comprises not only the up-to-date large 
producers of the south, southeast and Cerrado, but also 
the old landowning class of the semi-arid zone of the 
northeast, and the Brazilian farming frontier on the 
borders of the Amazon region. Thus, in this grouping the 
traditional and dynamic sectors of Brazilian farming 
mingle, both presenting themselves under a single, 
up-to-date discourse which covers up the internal 
differences between groups in the large-farm sector and 
which tries to take on board part of the family farming 
sector – that part which is also market-oriented. 
Narrative 2: Family farming as a superior social form of 
production
This narrative, in its original form, affirms that there is 
an antithesis between family farming and corporate 
agriculture – or, in the way it is reframed by the social 
movements, between family farming and agribusiness. 
The concept of family farming that it deploys is based 
on the European model, and even more so that of the 
US, and incorporates all the segments, from the 
‘consolidated’ to the ‘peripheral’ (to use the terminology 
adopted by the FAO/Incra report), setting aside any 
differences in terms of social or economic position. One 
of the consequences of this is a certain ambiguity in the 
discourse of some social movements, in which concepts 
like ‘food sovereignty’ or agroecology do not seem 
coherent with the condition of producers who are well 
integrated into global markets, and operate production 
processes that are standardised by the value chains 
controlled by the agro-food industries – using, for 
example, controversial modern technology-intensive 
techniques, whether in terms of machinery and chemical 
inputs or cultivation of genetically modified organisms. 
Established since the mid-1990s, this narrative was 
adopted by rural social movements, principally those 
organised in the farm workers’ unions: initially linked to 
the National Rural Workers’ Department of the CUT; later 
the group of unions associated with Contag; and more 
recently a group which broke away from that organisation, 
the Fetraf . Within the state, this narrative found expression 
in the creation of the MDA.
Those promoting this narrative range from producers 
with average levels of capitalisation in the south of Brazil 
to small-scale poor producers in the northeast and the 
Amazon region. There is a difficult relationship between 
this narrative and the more capitalised segment of family 
producers in the south, southeast and Cerrado, which 
often end up aligning themselves with the so-called 
agribusiness sector, although they are represented by 
the social movements as being family-based producers. 
Narrative 3: Peasant family farming
At the end of the 1990s and especially in the 2000s a 
third narrative emerged, which has progressively 
combined a discourse clamouring for more radical 
transformations in the agrarian structure with 
environmental demands. At the centre of this narrative 
is a sharp criticism of the capitalist character of modern 
farming, including the segment of family farmers who 
are involved in markets and using the technologies 
adopted by the major producers – which are required 
for integration into global agribusiness. For this reason, 
over time this narrative incorporated issues such as 
agroecology and a discourse of food sovereignty, in a 
radicalisation of the concept of food security. 
The main social base of this narrative comprises the 
poorest farmers who constitute the ‘peripheral fringe’ 
identified in the FAO/Incra study and, to a certain extent, 
part of the farmers in the ‘in transition’ group. Thus it 
includes poor family farmers in the south, the Amazon 
region and the semi-arid region of the northeast, but 
also landless rural workers from all over the country and 
those pushed out by the process of conservative 
modernisation. All the other producers are seen as a 
small-scale expression of the same model represented 
by agribusiness. 
In political terms, the main voice of this narrative is 
the MST and its international connection, Via Campesina. 
The same discourse is also shared by a range of NGOs 
that work with agroecology. At the state level, this 
narrative has been explicitly represented by Incra, the 
agency responsible for land reform and resettlement. 
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3.  Beyond the images of   
 dichotomy and coexistence  
 between agribusiness and  
 family farming: case study  
 examples 
Beyond the fields of organisational discourse, the 
dichotomy between agribusiness and family farming 
often also fails to hold up in relation to public policies. 
In examples such as the Prodecer and Proálcool 
programmes, which are veritable icons of Brazilian 
agricultural modernisation, there was the initial 
expectation that they could benefit small farmers in the 
effort to leverage the sector’s productivity. The results, 
as will be shown below, were much more ambiguous. 
Prodecer followed a cooperation agreement made 
between the Brazilian and Japanese governments in 1974 
(Muller 1990). Its main objectives were to increase the 
supply of agricultural products, especially soybean, and 
to stimulate the development of the Brazilian Cerrado, 
an area which at the time was a farming frontier for the 
country. The agreement involved creation of one holding 
company in Japan and another in Brazil, which together 
would form a company responsible for putting the 
programme into effect. It was the responsibility of 
Embrapa to adapt soybean lines to low latitudes and 
more acid soils, which enabled the enormous expansion 
of the area of central Brazil under cultivation. The 
programme is in its third phase, and now extends into 
the northern part of the country, with the expansion of 
soybean pressing on the borders of the Amazon region. 
The main beneficiaries of the investments made were 
medium-sized and large-scale farmers who underwent 
an intense process of capitalisation and technical 
upgrading, supported by the instruments of agricultural 
policy outlined in the first section of this paper. But it 
also benefited a segment of more highly-capitalised 
family farmers, especially in the south of Brazil where 
the farming frontier expansion process was reaching 
completion. The children of the family farmers of that 
region, characterised by the predominance of small 
farming establishments, saw in the new farming frontier 
of the Cerrado and the borderlands of the Amazon the 
possibility of acquiring new lands at lower prices than 
in their regions of origin. Thus a strong process of social 
differentiation was established, with the constitution of 
a segment of family producers with an advanced level 
of technological development using large areas in central 
Brazil. 
In a somewhat schematic form, it can be said that 
soybean in Brazil is now mainly grown by three different 
types of producer located in two different regions. In the 
south, the longer-established region of soybean 
production, it is cultivated on small properties – from 
20ha to 100ha – by family farmers who achieve good 
levels of productivity and income and are supported 
predominantly by the work of the family itself, with 
temporary workers hired only on occasion. Meanwhile 
in the center-west of Brazil and in the central plateau, 
two types of producers have established themselves. 
There is a generation of medium-sized farmers, usually 
children of family farmers from the south, who 
predominantly use family labour on large areas of land, 
in a highly mechanised model that is very similar to that 
of the family farmers of the United States. A typical 
producer in the Cerrado of Bahia has 800ha of land 
cultivated with the work of four people, all members of 
the same family or with some complementary salaried 
work. In the central plateau there is also a large number 
of farming companies, with very large expanses of land, 
supported primarily by salaried work. Most of these 
companies’ lands are also in the Cerrado. For this reason 
the Cerrado is today the region of largest concentration 
of land holdings in Brazil, and the worker/land area ratio 
(on average one person working for each 200ha of 
planted area) are exceeded only by those found in large-
scale cattle ranching. A large part of the soybean 
produced travels 2,000km to the ports in the southeast 
and south of Brazil to be exported as bulk grain for 
processing in external markets. 
The Proálcool programme had its origins in the first 
oil shock in 1973 (Nogueira 2008). The Brazilian 
government sought ways of reducing the country’s 
dependence on fossil fuels and softening the effects of 
the shock on the Brazilian economy. With the deterioration 
of the balance of payments and increasing inflation 
caused by the high price of oil, Brazil, which imported 
80 percent of its oil, found itself obliged to look for 
alternative renewable forms of fuel. Among the various 
programmes proposed the most successful was Proálcool, 
launched in 1975, which aimed initially to introduce 
anhydrous ethyl alcohol (ethanol) from sugarcane, made 
in distilleries attached to sugar mills, to be added to 
petrol. The programme was supported by public 
subsidies and financing, and it was the responsibility of 
the government, through the state oil company Petrobras, 
to buy, transport, store, distribute and mix the ethanol 
with petrol, as well as to decide the product’s selling 
price. 
With the second oil shock in 1979 the programme was 
expanded, in this phase aiming for production of 
bioethanol as a substitute for gasoline as fuel, with 
priority now being given to production of hydrated 
alcohol. The government began to stimulate consumption 
of ethanol by giving tax incentives for purchases of 
vehicles running exclusively on the fuel, among other 
measures. The government also converted its own 
vehicle fleet to run on ethanol. Thus began what some 
authors call the ‘golden age’ of the programme, which 
lasted until 1986. 
The third phase, starting from that year, was 
characterised by a certain crisis in the programme, to 
which various factors contributed – including the fall 
and stabilisation in the price of oil, the increase in the 
international market price of sugar and removal of 
financing and subsidies by the government, which was 
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facing serious fiscal and financial pressures. This resulted 
in the programme becoming discredited, and this effect 
was exacerbated by a supply crisis in 1989. 
In the 1990s the programme continued at reduced 
volume, with the government deregulating the market, 
freeing prices of products and allowing free competition. 
At the end of the decade the entrepreneurs of the sector 
began to group together – with the government and 
the automobile industry – to try to give the programme 
a new boost. In 2003 it began to re-emerge strongly, 
supported by the launch of flex-fuel vehicles, the new 
high price of oil and the increase in external demand 
arising from increased environmental awareness. In 2007 
the future outlook was optimistic but the economic 
policy of the Brazilian state, which kept petrol prices 
artificially low, harmed the competitiveness of ethanol, 
leading to another serious crisis in the sector, with closure 
of mills and disinvestment. 
In terms of the organisation of production, this process 
of modernisation as a whole led to a change in the 
geography of sugarcane growing. The most traditional 
(centuries-old) sugar-producing region is the coastal area 
of the northeast of Brazil, mainly in the states of 
Pernambuco, Paraíba and Alagoas. With the Proálcool 
programme the producers of these regions received 
many benefits, but did not manage to rebuild their 
productivity levels. Gradually, production migrated to 
São Paulo State, where more up-to-date industrial 
processing plants were installed, attracted by the high 
fertility of the soils (until then occupied by coffee) and 
the proximity of consumer markets, which reduced 
production costs. During the 1990s, especially, production 
expanded from São Paulo towards central Brazil, pushing 
soybean cultivation further to the north and helping 
make soybean itself a factor of pressure on the borders 
of the Amazon. Another factor that boosted the expansion 
of production of sugarcane in São Paulo and in central 
Brazil was the terrain, which facilitated mechanisation 
more than the hilly landscape of the traditional sugar-
growing areas of the northeast. Regardless, large-scale 
cultivation predominates in all three regions. In São Paulo 
there was an important segment of small and medium-
sized properties which were assumed to be potential 
beneficiaries at the outset the programme. However, with 
the passage of time these properties were leased to the 
major industrial sugar and ethanol companies. This is 
because the technological model of production of sugar 
and ethanol in Brazil calls for a large volume of regular 
supply. Stocking of sugarcane or delay in its arrival at the 
industrial plants results in a high loss of sucrose, damaging 
productivity. This model favours the expansion of 
monoculture and concentration of production as 
conditions for the sector to be viable. 
As can be seen from this brief history, although the 
sugar/ethanol segment is one of the most powerful parts 
of Brazilian agribusiness and has up-to-date 
entrepreneurial corporations, it is extremely vulnerable 
to government policies, whether for leverage or for its 
stabilisation. Also, although it is a traditional sector, with 
origins going back to the colonial period, the effort of 
modernisation in the last forty years had to be strongly 
supported by government investments in the form of 
research, credit and other support policies, especially in 
the field of energy planning (with the stimuli for 
replacement of petrol by ethanol) and industrial policy 
(with the introduction of flex-fuel vehicles). 
Another important aspect is that in the original 
documents of the Proálcool programme there was an 
expectation of benefiting small-scale sugarcane 
producers. The technological model adopted, however 
– based on large industrial plants – practically eliminated 
the viability of that group. In practice, the Brazilian model 
was something of a two-edged sword in terms of regional 
disparities, and had negative effects from the social and 
environmental points of view. In regional terms, its effect 
was, initially, to stimulate concentration in São Paulo, 
and in a second phase to dilute this concentration in the 
direction of central Brazil. But it did not have positive 
effects on Brazil’s northeast – the country’s poorest 
region. In the social and environmental dimensions, there 
was a tremendous stimulus to expansion of monocultures, 
replacing food crops; pressure on biodiversity; and 
indirect effects on ecosystems such as those of the 
Amazon region, as areas of pasture and soybean had to 
move further north to make room for the expansion of 
sugarcane. 
Summing up, the case of Proálcool shows how even 
when a programme is planned with the expectation of 
benefiting small farmers, the political dynamic can 
dictate technology choices, and public and private 
investment decisions, in a way that makes it difficult to 
achieve this initial purpose. In this sense, the idea of 
coexistence and complementarity between the family 
and corporate segments does not stand up to scrutiny 
of the effects generated by Brazilian policy on the 
sugarcane production sector, including severe socio-
environmental problems. This image could be used to 
strengthen the other established narrative – of the clear 
dichotomy between the corporate and family segments. 
On the other hand, the experience of Prodecer shows 
that even when a programme undeniably favoured 
concentration of land ownership, there was a small 
segment of family producers who benefited from the 
incentives and technological innovations that it made 
possible. That is to say, Prodecer helped generate a 
segment of family producers who, at the same time, are 
now part of Brazilian agribusiness. 
The same exercise could be carried out for Embrapa, 
another icon of Brazilian farming modernisation that is 
associated with the success of corporate agriculture. 
There is no doubt that this organisation was one of the 
principal moving factors responsible for building the 
competitiveness of large-scale Brazilian corporate 
agriculture. But some of the technologies it generated 
also benefited a segment – albeit undoubtedly 
numerically smaller – of family farmers. Furthermore, 
Embrapa also reveals an ongoing internal dispute, as its 
workforce includes a group of technical staff and 
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researchers who resolutely seek to influence the 
corporation’s strategies in a way that will bring it closer 
to family farmers and their needs and interests, thereby 
reducing the emphasis given to the corporate sector. 
Conclusion 
This paper has highlighted some of the contradictions 
and conflicts that have been involved in the Brazilian 
agricultural sector’s pathway of modernisation. The 
purpose was to offer an alternative vision to the ‘dualism’ 
that characterises the predominant approaches to the 
experience or model of Brazil’s rural development, in its 
two versions. The aim has been to make clear how the 
image of complementary coexistence between the 
corporate and family sectors of Brazilian agriculture 
obscures a series of economic, social and environmental 
aspects that need to be taken into account by those who 
aim to find, in this experience, an inspiration for framing 
public and private policies and investments. 
It must be made clear that everything that is being 
indicated here, based on the examples given, does not 
eliminate the distinctions that do in practice exist 
between family producers and the corporate segment. 
There is a totally legitimate ideological and political 
dispute and one that has very clear empirical grounds. 
There are, in practice, distinct and different interests 
between these two segments. If on the one hand their 
coexistence is undeniable, it is equally undeniable that 
it is far from being harmonious. At the same time, the 
aim has been to make clear how a ‘dichotomy’ approach 
to these two sectors disguises a reality that is much more 
nuanced, in which some of the groups of family farmers 
are shown to have interests that one recognises also in 
the narrative of agribusiness, and some farmers who are 
presented as rural entrepreneurs in practice are using 
their land only in pursuit of political power. A vision that 
is more in line with the reality would thus need to go 
beyond the two-dimensional view, and take on board 
the heterogeneous nature of the various social structures 
of production in Brazilian farming. 
As well as presenting this alternative vision – 
developing the predominant two-aspect narrative about 
the so-called Brazilian model into a more nuanced 
portrait – it should be clear from the pages above that 
this trajectory has not resulted solely from a strategy 
directed by the social groups that have controlled the 
state at certain points. The final outcome of the experience 
of agricultural modernisation in Brazil includes a group 
of effects that were not anticipated by the policy planners. 
That is to say, Brazilian agriculture and land policy 
processes have also responded – and to a very substantial 
extent – to the dynamics of the conflicts and tensions 
between different social organisations. The rules of the 
game in Brazilian farming are the result of a further game 
played around those rules, a situation in which social 
actors permanently dispute the legitimacy and the 
meaning of each social form of production, in a struggle 
which is at the same time material and symbolic, 
characterised by contestation over narratives of success 
or failure. 
This is perhaps the principal consequence of 
everything that has been discussed in this paper: these 
processes could be described as challenging the very 
existence of a Brazilian farming development model. 
There is not, in reality, a model per se, but a whole that 
contains, and is built from, many conflicting parts, as the 
result of an historical process. 
If this experience is to contribute to shaping policies 
and programmes in other countries, such as, for example, 
part of the African continent, it is necessary to take into 
account the learning processes that have been generated 
beyond the scope of the official world of policy, and to 
understand that the final results of any exportation of 
models will be the absorption of those narratives into 
and by a social fabric that has its own specific 
characteristics. In other words, the effects generated will 
obey this social dynamic much more than they will obey 
the intentions of the technical experts and the planners 
of policies. 
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